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Abstract 
This paper examines the contract interpretation strategies adopted by the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) for its credit derivatives 
contracts in the Greek sovereign debt crisis. We argue that the economic function 
of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) after Greece is limited and uncertain, 
partly thanks to ISDA’s insistence on textualist interpretation. Contract theory 
explanations for textualist preferences emphasise either transactional efficiency or 
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relational factors, which do not fit ISDA or the derivatives market. We pose an 
alternative explanation: the embrace of textualism in this case may be a means for 
ISDA to reconcile the competing political demands from state regulators and its 
market constituents. We describe categories of contracts susceptible to such 
political demands, and consider when and why textualism might be the preferred 
response. 
Keywords: CDS, Greece, ISDA, Determinations Committee, restructuring, 
contracts, textualist, contextualist. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On 9 March 2012, the world of finance celebrated the survival of a $3 trillion 
market against all odds. Seeing market and contract machinery for sovereign credit 
default swaps (CDS) work precisely as specified when Greece finally moved to 
restructure its debt must have seemed like a miracle after two years of fear and 
loathing heaped upon CDS by the press and top public officials.1 And from the 
press releases of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) it did 
indeed seem that all had gone as planned:2 ISDA’s adjudication body promptly 
declared a ‘credit event’ under CDS contracts on Greek debt, which triggered an 
obligation of CDS ‘protection sellers’ to pay ‘protection buyers’ for the loss in 
value on Greek bonds. An auction followed quickly to determine just how much the 
sellers owed the buyers; the results were in line with the actual losses on the bonds 
(roughly 79%). Even better, the total net payments due were tiny (under $3 billion) 
compared to the size of the restructured debt stock ($350 billion), dispelling fears of 
systemic shock.3 A Bloomberg headline summed it up: ‘Credit Default Swaps 
Work (See Greece)’.4 What is not to like? 
We are sceptical. Far from revealing a well-oiled machine at work, the March 
events were a mix of luck and magic, which masked flaws in the contractual and 
institutional basis of the sovereign CDS market. After Greece, buyers of sovereign 
                                                                                                                                               
1 See, e.g., G. Morgenson, ‘Credit Default Swaps as a Scare Tactic in Greece’, New York 
Times (19 November 2011). 
2 P. Eavis, ‘Debt Insurance in Greece Must Pay Out, Ruling Says’, New York Times, 9 March 
2012 (quoting ISDA General Counsel, Robert Pickel: ‘We saw today that the credit default swap 
market worked.’). 
3 Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, ‘DTCC Successfully Completes Greek CDS 
Restructuring Credit Event Processing’ (27 March 2012), available at: <http://www.dtcc.com/ 
news/press/releases/2012/dtcc_successfully_completes_greek_cds.php>. 




CDS are left exposed to most kinds of sovereign credit risk. Even for risks that are 
covered, the likely amount of compensation is anyone’s guess. And sovereigns can 
structure their debt relief operations to affect triggers and payouts on CDS. This 
outcome follows from a distinct set of contract interpretation strategies deployed by 
ISDA to save both the CDS market and its own role in this market from 
government regulators. Having secured breathing space, ISDA may seek reforms to 
revive sovereign CDS; however, at this writing, the instrument remains something 
of a zombie. 
We look to the Greek CDS episode for clues about the role of trade groups in 
drafting and adjudicating standardised contracts and, in particular, for how trade 
group and industry objectives – as distinct from those of the parties – might affect 
contract interpretation. ISDA’s position as the intermediary between one of the 
biggest financial markets and the most powerful governments in the world may 
help explain the interpretive choices, and shed light on some of the otherwise 
puzzling outcomes in its contract adjudication. As part of the task, our paper 
revisits an old question: what roles do text, context and trade custom play in the 
interpretation of commercial contracts?5 The text-context debate in contract theory 
is relevant because ISDA cites its knowledge of market context in support of its 
model of private adjudication, yet it chose textualist readings of its contracts at key 
junctures in the Greek crisis. We consider this apparent disconnect at the end of the 
paper. 
Although we tap into a rich body of work on contract interpretation and trade 
custom, the contracts in our story are new to this literature. In the derivatives 
industry, a single ISDA contract form spans a multi-trillion dollar market, where 
transactions are consummated in seconds. The economic stakes in the interpretation 
strategy are enormous: uncertainty or error can move billions among parties to 
standard-form contracts in an instant. Beyond the parties, derivatives contract 
interpretation can have spillover effects on the financial markets and the broader 
economy, with implications for interest rates, exchange rates and government 
finance. Sovereign credit derivatives – the focus of our paper – add the politics of 
government finance to the mix. When a financial contract stands accused of causing 
the global financial crisis and threatening the break-up of Europe, the political 
stakes in its interpretation are huge, quite apart from its micro- and macroeconomic 
significance. 
The drafting and interpretation of these all-important contracts are the province 
of a single trade group, ISDA. ISDA contracts take a distinctive modular form, 
which we elaborate in section 3. Different parts are prepared at different times and 
                                                                                                                                               
5 A. Schwartz and R.E. Scott, ‘Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law’, 113 Yale 
Law Journal (2003) p. 541. For a recent review of the literature on incorporating custom into 
adjudication across different settings, including merchant courts, see J. Blocher, ‘Order Without 
Judges: Customary Adjudication’, Duke Law Journal (forthcoming 2012). 
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by different people, but incorporate one another by reference to form a single 
contract. One such contract might comprise the long-term framework for the 
parties’ relationship, confirmations documenting instantaneous trades, definitions 
that apply across the market in the products being traded, and collateral 
arrangements particular to the parties, but not to each trade. Most parts of the 
contract are defaults; while parties customise on the margins, standardisation is 
pervasive. For example, an authoritative interpretation of CDS Definitions would 
directly and immediately apply across the CDS market. ISDA’s recently established 
adjudication procedure for CDS reflects this structure: the Determinations 
Committees (DCs) do not wade into disputes between individual contract 
counterparties, but rather issue interpretive rulings at the request of industry 
members to the industry as a whole. We consider this procedure as an example of 
private commercial adjudication, but one that contrasts in important respects with 
the sort contracts scholars have described for other industries.6 
In some respects, the derivatives industry looks similar to other merchant 
communities: it is an insular world with its own language and transaction patterns, 
and an island of private governance in a financial industry heavily regulated by the 
state. Despite their size, derivatives markets ordinarily operate with considerable 
informality.7 Much like the diamond, grain and cotton merchants of yore, 
derivatives market participants struggle with the challenges of rapid growth and 
geographic expansion, albeit on a vast scale. A limited number of large repeat 
players (the dealers) have historically dominated the market and its governance, 
with smaller, newer and occasional participants only recently winning seats at the 
table. Even the textualist bend of ISDA Determinations Committees seems 
consistent with other industries, where scholars describe merchant courts hewing 
closely to the words on the page even if the parties had ignored them until the 
dispute broke out.8 
Comparisons with goods traders and merchant courts soon reach their limits. 
First, except for a few key commodities, no single market in goods can claim the 
economic and political significance of derivatives. The effect of ISDA contracts on 
the world beyond them means that contracting parties’ interests and incentives are 
often at risk of being overshadowed by larger forces. Second, it is hard to adapt 
essential notions like trade custom to sovereign CDS and ISDA DCs: sovereign 
                                                                                                                                               
6 L. Bernstein, ‘Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms’, 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1996) p. 1765; L. 
Bernstein, ‘The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A 
Preliminary Study’, 66 University of Chicago Law Review (1999) p. 710. 
7 A. Raskolnikov, ‘The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings’, 71 University 
of Chicago Law Review (2007) p. 601, at pp. 621-623; Deutsche Bank AG v. AMBAC Credit 
Products, LLC, 04 Civ. 5594, 2006 WL 1867497, at pp. 12-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
8 Bernstein, ‘Merchant Court’, supra n. 6; Bernstein, ‘Questionable Empirical Basis’, supra 
n. 6. 
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defaults are tail-risk events that inject politics into commerce; they are the antithesis 
of routine commercial iterations out of which merchant custom grows. Sovereign 
CDS contracts are notoriously incomplete, unable to anticipate with specificity the 
core risks for which they are designed, but the store of practice available to ISDA 
adjudicators to complete the contracts is scant at best. Third, contract theory 
explanations for the mix of informal transactions and textualist adjudication do not 
fit the derivatives industry. In other communities, courts might distinguish between 
‘relationship-preserving’ and ‘end-game’ norms,9 but ISDA DCs do not consider 
individual relationships. They speak to the legal import of contingencies in the 
outside world to many different relationships at once, some ‘end-game’, some not.10 
Their textualism may need additional explanation. 
In this paper, we begin our search for explanations of ISDA’s interpretive 
strategy. Our case study tracks five shocks to ISDA-drafted CDS contracts from the 
Greek debt crisis. These came in quick succession over a year, and culminated in 
the restructuring in March of 2012. Each shock revealed progressively narrower 
‘risk coverage’ flowing from a textualist reading of the CDS contracts. 
Section 2 highlights our points of departure in the literature on contract 
interpretation and trade groups. We describe the relevant ISDA contracts and 
institutions in section 3. Section 4 sets out the five shocks and the interpretive 
responses that followed. We conclude with implications for contracts, regulation 
and industry governance. 
2. TEXT, CONTEXT AND TRADE 
The debate between ‘textualists’ and ‘contextualists’ over contract interpretation 
goes back decades.11 and intersects with scholarship on dispute resolution and social 
norms.12 Noting the essential contours of the text-context debate helps explain why 
derivatives contracts and ISDA’s role are a puzzle. 
Textualists argue that courts interpreting commercial contracts should give 
primacy to contract text, and limit recourse to extrinsic evidence such as pre- and 
post-contractual words and actions of the parties, and the social context, including 
industry custom. Their reasoning is usually couched in economic terms, and asso-
                                                                                                                                               
9 Ibid. 
10  ISDA, Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees Rules (11 July 2011), available at: 
<http://www.isda.org/credit/docs/DC_Rules_(July-11_2011).pdf>. 
11  For a discussion of the debate, see A. Schwartz and R.E. Scott, ‘Contract Interpretation 
Redux’, 119 Yale Law Journal (2010) p. 926. 
12  R.C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard University 
Press 1991); Bernstein, ‘Merchant Court’, supra n. 6; Bernstein, ‘Questionable Empirical Basis’, 
supra n. 6. 
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ciated with the formalist and neo-formalist streams in legal analysis.13 The 
prevailing argument for text over context combines party autonomy and efficiency 
concerns: merchants should want courts to rely as much as possible on the plain 
meaning of the contract text so as to minimise incentives for opportunistic 
behaviour ex post and thereby encourage efficient investment ex ante. If excluding 
extrinsic evidence occasionally causes a court to misidentify the true intent of the 
parties, merchants should still prefer textualism so long as they win about as much 
as they lose from court errors over time: the benefit of deterring opportunism is 
worth it. In this view, courts do and should help police the boundary between the 
informal domain of transactions and ‘relationship-preserving norms’, and the 
formal domain of adjudication and ‘end-game norms’, which the parties enter only 
after abandoning efforts to save their relationship. Contract text is written for the 
end-game, and merits special deference as a result. 
When they describe adjudication in their industry, at least some merchants 
appear to side with the textualists. This merchant testimony also supports a 
statutory critique and an institutional competence argument: when business people 
cannot rely on commercial codes and public courts to respect their contract text, 
they will opt out of the public legal system in favour of private industry rules and 
tribunals.14 
Contextualists, in contrast, stress the primacy of the contracting parties’ socially 
embedded meaning in any given dispute.15 Their roots are in legal realism and the 
later literature on relational contracting.16 US scholars on all sides of the debate 
usually cite the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) – with its call to find the parties’ 
agreement in ‘the language used by them and … their action, read and interpreted 
in the light of commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances’17 – as the 
apotheosis of contextualism. Where textualists seek to fix drafting and negotiating 
incentives on average to achieve an efficient stream of transactions, contextualists 
                                                                                                                                               
13  See, e.g., Symposium ‘Formalism Revisited: Formalism in Commercial Law’, at pp. 527, 
710-859. 
14  Bernstein, ‘Merchant Court’, supra n. 6; Bernstein, ‘Questionable Empirical Basis’, supra 
n. 6; L. Bernstein, ‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry’, 21 Journal of Legal Studies (1992) p. 115. 
15  See, for example, Uniform Commercial Code, Art. 1-303, 2-208 (on the respective roles of 
course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade in contract interpretation). 
16  S. Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’, 28 American 
Sociological Review (1963) p. 55; S. Macaulay, ‘The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures 
of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules’, 66 Modern Law 
Review (2003) p. 44; I.R. Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’, 47 Southern California Law 
Review (1974) p. 691; I.R. Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations 
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law’, 72 Northwestern University Law 
Review (1978) p. 854. For an overview, see Symposium ‘Relational Contract Theory: 
Unanswered Questions’, 94 Northwestern University Law Review (2000). 
17  Uniform Commercial Code, Art. 1-303, Official Comment 1; see also ibid, Art. 1-201(3). 
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might import the parties’ evolving relationship and its thick social context into the 
court’s reading of the text … or might abandon the text altogether. Where 
textualists see a bright line between relational commerce and formal disputes, 
contextualists see seamless continuity. Thus a full-blown contextualist disposition 
might prompt a court to use all available evidence to discern the parties’ contractual 
intent.18 
As evidence of context goes, trade custom – produced by non-parties and 
discernible through expert testimony and other reasonably objective means – 
appears more reliable than most. It has been embraced by a broad spectrum of 
scholars, including some not particularly associated with legal realism or social 
norms.19 Custom also plays a prominent role in critiques of textualist description, 
which point to the fact that trade custom may be embedded in merchant 
consciousness and behaviour. When merchants claim to be reading the plain text, 
they are in fact reading through the lens of customary context.20 Even so, it can be 
hard to tell what counts as custom, and where to find custom relevant to a given 
dispute.21 It can be local, national and global; formal and informal – as in standard 
contracts and written industry codes, and unwritten norms of behaviour that are 
more or less widely held, but go without saying. The UCC recognises that custom 
may be a dynamic mix of fact and law: usage to be discerned by the jury, and rules 
to be applied by the judge.22 
Trade groups are the natural and usual guardians of custom in all its forms. 
Research on trade groups and contracts echoes some of the preceding arguments on 
interpretation, but adds a distinct set of concerns. First, it takes on the descriptive 
task of cataloguing associations and their role in the contracting process.23 Second, 
it seeks to identify the distinct contribution of trade groups to contracts. Such 
contributions may be presumptively positive – solving collective action problems 
among members, reducing transaction costs, collecting and interpreting infor-
                                                                                                                                               
18  A classic example is Justice Traynor’s opinion in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas 
Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P. 2d 641 (Cal. 1968). 
19  See e.g., R. Epstein, ‘Confusion About Custom: Disentangling Informal Customs from 
Standard Contractual Provisions’, 66 University of Chicago Law Review (1999) p. 821; R. 
Barnett, ‘The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent’, 78 Virginia Law Review 
(1992) p. 821, at p. 862. 
20  D.V. Snyder, ‘Language and Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom 
and Conduct’, 54 Southern Methodist University Law Review (2001) p. 617. 
21  R. Craswell, ‘Do Trade Customs Exist?’, in J.S. Kraus and S.D. Walt, eds., The 
Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2007) p. 118. 
22  Uniform Commercial Code, Art. 1-303(c): ‘The existence and scope of such a usage must 
be proved as facts. If it is established that such a usage is embodied in a trade code or similar 
record, the interpretation of the record is a question of law.’ 
23  R.C. Ellickson, ‘A Review of Legal Scholarship on Informal Order, with a Focus on the 
Roles of Private Associations’, Working Paper (1 October 2011) (on file with authors). 
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mation, and producing reliable, efficient standard contract terms.24 – or less so, 
including rent-seeking, anti-competitive and oppressive behaviour.25 
The question of whether courts should defer to trade groups is related to but 
ultimately distinct from the question of interpretation strategy. To a narrow 
textualist, trade groups might well be irrelevant except to the extent they produce 
contract texts and need incentives to produce ones that are efficient. To others, the 
question of deference depends on factors ranging from trade groups’ legitimacy (as 
some combination of representativeness and efficacy) to their superior capacity to 
identify the relevant trade custom and advance the interests of their members. 
Law scholars tend to regard trade groups as sources of practical wisdom for 
public courts and legislatures, as a means of boosting efficiency and lightening 
judicial workloads, and occasionally, as competitors to the public institutions. By 
definition, trade groups must have a deep understanding of the ways and 
preferences of their members. Having codified custom in contract and having 
tackled many similar disputes, such groups should be able to discern the intentions 
of the contracting parties and calculate the impact of their decisions on the parties 
and the industry better than any public court could ever hope to do. Capacity to 
sanction non-compliance through shunning, expulsion and other non-state means, 
bolsters trade groups’ law-making potential. They can provide significant 
economies in terms of both dispute resolution and enforcement over the public 
alternatives.26 From this vantage point, the continued existence of contract drafting 
and adjudicating trade groups is evidence of their legitimacy and efficacy. 
Not everyone accepts the foregoing description; if it were accurate, trade group-
led contracting would be much more pervasive.27 Nevertheless, the dominant view 
in legal scholarship is one of optimism about the ability of trade groups to bring 
expert contextual analysis to the table, and to secure the right outcome at minimal 
cost. ISDA’s role in the Greek crisis presents an opportunity to think about this 
                                                                                                                                               
24  K.E. Davis, ‘The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate’, 104 Michigan Law 
Review (2006) p. 1075; S.J. Choi and G.M. Gulati, ‘Contract as Statute’, 104 Michigan Law 
Review (2006) p. 1129; R. Scott, ‘The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract’, 94 
Northwestern University Law Review (2000) p. 847; R. Scott and C. Goetz, ‘The Limits of 
Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract 
Terms’, 73 California Law Review (1985) p. 261 (Scott and Goetz note that sometimes industry 
groups can operate at cross-purposes, which detracts from their utility in developing standard 
terms). 
25  D. Charny, ‘The New Formalism in Contract’, 66 University of Chicago Law Review 
(1999) p. 842; D.V. Snyder, ‘Contract Regulation, With and Without the State: Ruminations on 
Rules and Their Sources. A Comment on Jurgen Basedow’, 56 American Journal of Comparative 
Law (2008) p. 723. 
26  B. Richman, ‘Norms and Law, Putting the Horse before the Cart’, Duke Law Journal 
(forthcoming 2012) (suggesting that the literature has significantly underestimated the 
enforcement value of these groups and overestimated their abilities on the interpretive front). 
27  Ibid.; Charny, supra n. 25; Snyder, supra n. 25. 
CDS Zombies 355
view in a new setting. After describing ISDA, its contracts and adjudication 
institutions, we consider a series of contract interpretations by ISDA Determi-
nations Committees. Unlike the prior literature, we end up asking not only what the 
trade group does for contracts or adjudication, but also what contracts and 
adjudication might do for the trade group and the broader institutional setting in 
which it operates. 
3. ISDA’S REALM 
3.1 Contract mission 
ISDA emerged in the mid-1980s to standardise a vocabulary for the most basic of 
derivatives contracts (interest rate and currency swaps), and has risen in 
prominence along with the market it oversees. The ubiquity of derivatives in all 
aspects of finance gives ISDA a credible claim to universality within the financial 
industry, compared to groups responsible for smaller market segments.28 Yet 
ISDA’s mandate is also limited by its contract mission. Even though just about 
every institutional participant in the global financial markets uses ISDA’s contracts, 
ISDA does not claim to represent the financial industry in general, or a particular 
subset of firms, on all manner of contract and policy concerns but only insofar as 
such firms use its contracts.29 ISDA is also distinct for its emphatically transnational 
character. At the start, its mission was to make its contracts work in both New York 
and London; it has since expanded to the far corners of the globe. Other 
associations that draft standard-form contracts for multi-trillion dollar markets are 
rooted in particular national jurisdictions.30 Still others have a transnational 
membership and may draft contracts or codes of conduct on occasion, but are not 
organised around documenting a category of financial instruments and creating a 
global infrastructure to trade them.31 ISDA’s membership may overlap with those 
of the other trade groups, but its job and its methods are distinct. 
It is hard to conceive of a stronger.32 and more successful trade group in charge 
of more important contracts than ISDA, if success is to be measured by share of the 
                                                                                                                                               
28  ISDA membership lists are available at: <http://www.isda.org/membership/isdamembers 
list.pdf>; for a comparison, see, e.g., EMTA, About EMTA, available at: <http://www.emta.org>, 
and Member Institutions, available at: <http://www.emta.org/template.aspx?id=65>. 
29  See, e.g., Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, About SIFMA, available 
at: <http://www.sifma.org/about>. 
30  See, e.g., British Bankers Association, About Us, available at: <http://www.bba.org.uk/ 
about-us>. 
31  See, e.g., Institute of International Finance, About IIF, available at: <http://www.iif.com/ 
about>. 
32  Ellickson, supra n. 12. 
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contract market and importance by dollar volume or impact on the global economy. 
To the extent it is feasible, applying the work to trade groups in commercial 
contract drafting and interpretation could have a tremendous payoff here. Studying 
ISDA could yield insights for the commercial contracting literature, or illuminate 
contracts and contracting practices it does not explain. 
ISDA shares similarities with the groups described in this literature; we noted 
some of these at the start of the article. ISDA’s markets are insular and informal, 
dominated by repeat players. Its early task was to standardise the industry lexicon;33 it 
has adapted its governance strategies in response to growth and globalisation.34 But 
several differences are striking. First, the economic significance of the derivatives 
market and the ever-present spectre of financial regulation make governments a 
permanent factor in ISDA’s life: unlike diamond and cotton merchants, who can ‘opt 
out’ of public institutions by creating parallel private ones, derivatives market 
participants are in constant battle against government intervention. Second, because 
derivatives contracts involve so many diverse economic actors and forms of 
economic activity, they require more reliance on public enforcement. For example, 
the operation of collateral provisions in ISDA contracts and these contracts’ treatment 
in bankruptcy implicate third parties who might have no other connection to, and 
have no reputational stake in, the derivatives markets. Perhaps as a result, ISDA’s 
work seems to be as much about interfacing with the outside world as about keeping 
order among members. Dispute resolution is at best tangential to its mission. In 
contrast, the rulemaking and contract-drafting of the more familiar merchant 
associations respond to their dispute resolution needs. As we elaborate later in this 
section, ISDA’s adjudication responded to a distinct set of contract, market 
infrastructure and regulatory imperatives. 
ISDA’s contracts are unusual. They are centrally produced under the auspices of 
a membership committee, coordinated by ISDA staff, with the help of outside 
counsel. They take a modular form (Figure 1) and are highly standardised, though 
adapted on the margins by market participants to fit their needs.35 ISDA takes 
copyright in the standard forms. 
                                                                                                                                               
33  Compare mid-20th century textile industry initiatives in Bernstein, ‘Questionable 
Empirical Basis’, supra n. 6, at p. 733. 
34  A.C. Gooch and L.B. Klein, Documentation for Derivatives, 4th edn. (Euromoney 2002), 
at pp. 18-19 (describing ISDA’s founding); A. Riles, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in 
the Global Financial Markets (University Of Chicago Press 2011) (describing ISDA’s work in 
Japan); compare the diamond industry’s adaptation from community to information-based 
governance in Bernstein, ‘Opting Out’, supra n. 14. 
35  See G. Charles, ‘The ISDA Master Agreement – Part I: Architecture, Risks and 
Compliance’, Practical Compliance & Risk Management for the Securities Industry (January-
February 2012); see G. Charles, ‘The ISDA Master Agreement – Part I: Negotiated Provisions’, 
Practical Compliance & Risk Management for the Securities Industry (May-June 2012); Allen 
and Overy, ‘An Introduction to the Documentation of OTC Derivatives: Ten Themes’ (May 
2002), available at: <http://www.isda.org/educat/pdf/ten-themes.pdf>. 
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Figure 1: ISDA Contract Framework 
(Shaded portions reflect party or transaction-specific modules; the rest apply market-
wide.) 
 
The Master Agreement is at the centre of the ISDA framework. First adopted in 
1992, with a new version issued in 2002, the Master operates bilaterally between 
the parties that adopt it; however, in some respects it resembles an industry-wide 
constitution. This is because the core terms (representations, covenants, events of 
default, early termination procedures) apply across the derivatives industry and 
across all product categories. Parties vary the terms through negotiated Schedules to 
the Master. The Master also establishes the relationship among the different parts of 
the contract suite. Protocols effect industry-wide changes to the Master; market 
participants that accede to a protocol are bound by its terms vis-à-vis others that do 
the same. Credit Support documentation is another relationship-specific module of 
the contract. It establishes the terms on which the contracting parties may obtain 
collateral from each other to mitigate counterparty credit risk. Standard-form Credit 
Support documents vary by jurisdiction (for example, ISDA offers New York, 
English and Japanese law annexes). As with the Master, parties adopt the ISDA 
annexes and use the Schedules to tailor the annex terms to their relationship. 
Product-specific Definitions are incorporated by reference in individual trans-
actions. Like the Master, these apply market-wide; unlike the Master, they are 
limited to particular derivatives products, such as equity, credit, or commodities 
swaps, and over a dozen others. The last piece of the puzzle is the Confirmation, the 
only transaction-specific document in the suite, which sets out the economic terms 
of a trade and incorporates the relevant Definitions. 
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All but the short-form Confirmation are either centrally produced or negotiated 
in advance between the counterparties. Thus the Master, Protocols and Definitions 
might be produced by ISDA at different times with the help of one or more big law 
firms; the Schedules and collateral arrangements are negotiated bilaterally between 
counterparties, each represented by in-house or outside counsel, and the Confirma-
tions are filled in by traders after they consummate the trade over the telephone.36 
Even the party- and transaction-specific modules start with ISDA standard forms. 
The entire suite is meant to work across different jurisdictions.37 
This structure makes it possible for market participants to transact across the 
globe in a matter of seconds, reflecting the cost savings goal of standardisation. The 
network effects of having everyone in the market use essentially the same 
documentation boost liquidity.38 Buyers and sellers need not draft or analyse new 
contracts for each new trade, new counterparty, or even new jurisdiction – they 
know ISDA contracts work and are interoperable; as a result, more stand ready to 
trade. Standardisation and continued adaptation of derivatives contracts under 
ISDA’s auspices since the late 1980s get credit for the astronomical growth of the 
derivatives market to over $440 trillion in outstanding notional amounts in late 
2011.39 Over $362 trillion of the total is interest rate contracts. Credit derivatives 
represent about $26 trillion, of which under $3 trillion is contracts on sovereign 
debt. CDS have grown quickly, multiplying fifteen-fold since 1982 (interest rate 
contracts grew fivefold).40 
ISDA has succeeded at insulating this vast market from intrusive regulation of 
the sort that defined the rest of the financial industry: ISDA contracts are exempt 
from securities and commodities regulations.41 and from key bankruptcy law 
                                                                                                                                               
36  Delays in confirming transactions drew the attention of regulators in the mid-2000s and led 
to reforms of industry practice. See BIS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, ‘New 
Developments in Clearing and Settlement Arrangements for OTC Derivatives’ (March 2007), 
available at: <http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss77.pdf>. 
37  Some modules – notably collateral arrangements – use different governing law; in 
addition, ISDA secures legal opinions from dozens of jurisdictions assuring its members that its 
Master and Credit Support agreements would be enforced as written. ISDA, Opinions, available 
at: <http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/legal-and-documentation/opinions>. 
38  M. Kahan and M. Klausner, ‘Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or 
“The Economics of Boilerplate”)’, 83 Virginia Law Review (1997) p. 713. 
39  ISDA, ‘OTC Derivatives Market Analysis Year-end 2011’ (June 2012), available at: 
<http://isda.derivativiews.org/2012/06/07/342>. Notional amounts do not normally reflect the 
counterparties’ actual exposure, but rather the value of the reference asset on which the 
transaction is based. For example, if the contract is to swap interest streams on a principal amount 
of $1 million, the notional amount of the contract is $1 million. ISDA figures are adjusted to 
exclude foreign exchange derivatives and double-counting in cleared transactions. 
40  Ibid.; DTCC Deriv/SERV Trade Information Warehouse Data Section I, Tables 2 and 3, 
available at: <http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data_table_i.php?tbid=2>. 
41  See, e.g., Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 
2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); F. Partnoy, ‘ISDA, NASD, CFMA, 
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provisions around the world.42 To secure and maintain the exemptions, ISDA has 
interfaced with legislatures, regulators and the courts to position its contracts as 
both essential and exceptional: essential because they support all manner of 
financial activity and are indispensable to the functioning of finance, exceptional 
because they are structured to manage risk among sophisticated parties. In this 
view, misguided regulation could be socially costly, while its benefits are small and 
uncertain. But precisely because derivatives are so important, demonstrating 
sophistication is not enough to keep regulation at bay. Even if the market 
participants do not need government protection, the potential spillover effects of 
mishaps in this multi-trillion dollar market call for intervention, unless the industry 
can show that it can be trusted to keep its own house in order. 
In response, ISDA has increasingly assumed a role far beyond traditional 
lobbying, taking responsibility for market infrastructure and ultimately 
adjudication. For example, faced with criticism for lack of transparency and long 
lags in trade documentation,43 ISDA worked to clean up back-office practices 
across the industry and centralise trade reporting. It introduced an auction 
settlement mechanism in the CDS market to counter price distortions, then followed 
up with an adjudication mechanism to support auction settlement. And when courts 
in New York interpreted its contracts in ways that ISDA deemed problematic for 
the market, it responded nimbly, in one case changing the boilerplate, in another 
filing an amicus brief.44 
The regulatory truce lasted until 2008 with relatively few disruptions.45 Then 
ISDA and the derivatives industry entered a fight for their lives. CDS contracts 
                                                                                                                                               
and SDNY: The Four Horsemen of Derivatives Regulation?’, Brookings-Wharton Papers on 
Financial Services (R.E. Litan and R. Herring, eds., 2002) p. 213. 
42  D. Duffie and D.A. Skeel, ‘A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for 
Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements’, University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 12-02 (1 March 2012), Rock Center for Corporate Governance at 
Stanford University Working Paper No. 108, Stanford University Working Paper No. 108, 
available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1982095>; S.J. Lubben, ‘Credit Derivatives and the Future 
of Chapter 11’, 81 American Bankruptcy Law Journal (2007) p. 405; A. Riles, ‘The Transnational 
Appeal of Formalism: The Case of Japan’s Netting Law’, Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum 
Research Paper No. 00-03, 2000, available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=162588>. 
43  Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra n. 36. 
44  Choi and Gulati, supra n. 24; Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Co. of N.Y. & J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 375 F.3d 168 (Jul. 9, 2004); Brief of Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Brief of Defendant-Appellant, AON Financial Products v. Société Générale, No. 
06-1090-CV, at 4-5 (2d Cir. May 8, 2006). 
45  The collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund in 1998 was a notable 
disruption, reviving the call for both hedge fund and derivatives regulation. President’s Working 
Group on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital 
Management (1999), available at: <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/ 
hedgfund.pdf>. 
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were at the heart of the fight because of their capacity to create and reduce synthetic 
exposure to credit risk on a potentially unlimited scale. Labelled ‘financial weapons 
of mass destruction’ by Warren Buffett and tools of ‘destructive speculation’ by 
European officials, CDS were widely blamed for exacerbating the financial crisis 
on both sides of the Atlantic.46 Regulation became a near-certainty at the height of 
the US mortgage crisis;47 by the time the focus had shifted to European sovereign 
debt problems in 2010, outright prohibition was gaining ground.48 
3.2 CDS, defined 
Our case study concerns the interpretation of ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions 
in the Greek crisis of 2010-12, when the continued existence of the market was a 
matter of urgent public debate. The Definitions embody the basic workings of the 
CDS instrument: a promise by the ‘protection seller’ to compensate the ‘protection 
buyer’ for the loss in value of the underlying ‘reference obligation’ should a ‘credit 
event’ occur with respect to it during the term of the CDS contract. In exchange for 
this promise of contingent compensation, the protection buyer pays a periodic 
premium to the seller. The CDS price varies inversely with the price of the 
underlying debt: for example, if the debtor runs into trouble, its debt prices will fall, 
it will have to pay higher interest rates, and the price of CDS on its debt should go 
up. Although the basic structure of the contract resembles bond insurance, unlike 
insurance, the protection buyer need not hold the bond to buy a CDS on it. Also 
unlike insurance, CDS contracts are actively traded. Some are more liquid than the 
underlying bonds. 
Market participants’ motives for buying and selling CDS vary. Protection 
buyers may choose CDS to insure against default, or as a way to bet against the 
                                                                                                                                               
46  R. Pickel, Testimony Before the Committee on Agriculture, US House of Representatives 
(8 December 2008), available at: <http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/110/h81208/Pickel. 
pdf>; R.M. Stulz, ‘Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis’, 24 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives (Winter 2010) p. 73. 
47  See, e.g., Group of Twenty, Leaders’ Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and 
the World Economy, Washington, D.C., 15 November 2008, available at: <http://www.g20. 
utoronto.ca/2008/2008declaration1115.html>; Testimony of Superintendent Eric Dinallo, New 
York State Insurance Department, to the United States House of Representatives Committee on 
Agriculture Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy (20 
November 2008), available at: <http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/speeches_ins/sp0811201.pdf>; 
Group of 30, Financial Reform: A Framework for Stability (2009), at p. 52, available at: <http:// 
www.group30.org/images/PDF/Financial_Reform-A_Framework_for_Financial_Stability.pdf>. 
48  See, e.g., Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), Press Release, ‘BaFin Prohibits 
Naked Short-Selling Transactions and Naked CDS in Government Bonds of Euro Zone’ (18 May 
2010), available at: <http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Pressemitteilung/ 
2010/pm_100518_cds_leerverkauf_allgemeinverfuegungen_en.html>. On the law and economics 
of short selling, see J. Payne, ‘The Regulation of Short Selling and Its Reform in Europe’, 13 
European Business Organization Law Review (2012) p. 413. 
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underlying credit (or one that is closely correlated).49 Protection sellers may be 
expressing optimism about the credit, or their own capacity to manage the risk. If 
the buyer is a regulated institution, holding CDS can bring regulatory capital relief. 
Especially where the CDS contract references a creditworthy debtor (for 
example, Exxon or Germany), neither the buyer nor the seller of protection might 
be expecting default. Here, CDS is less like insurance against non-payment and 
more like an alternative way of betting on relative price movements – a stand-in for 
the bond itself.50 CDS are designed to isolate underlying credit risk while stripping 
out interest rate and currency risks and most transactional contingencies. For 
example, they would not trigger when an ancillary covenant is breached, when the 
reference obligation turns out to be unenforceable, or when the currency in which it 
is expressed loses value. They would trigger when the debtor misses a payment. For 
this reason, CDS prices are sometimes said to convey better, less noisy information 
about the underlying credit than the reference obligation itself.51 CDS can also be 
cost-effective: selling protection generally does not require up-front funding, but 
provides the economic equivalent of buying the underlying bond. 
The job of ISDA contracts in the CDS market is, among other things, to identify 
‘credit-related occurrences’52 that should trigger payouts in a way that supports the 
inverse relationship between bond and CDS prices. Credit Derivatives Definitions 
have an important place in the contract architecture because they describe the credit 
events that apply market-wide. Credit event definitions are default terms that may 
be varied by the parties; in practice, few market participants diverge from the ISDA 
standard, because doing so would make their contracts less liquid. 
The Definitions booklets cover the universe of credit derivatives, including CDS 
on corporate, sovereign and municipal obligations in different parts of the world. 
Individual CDS contracts generally do not include each credit event in the booklet, 
but follow a menu approach dictated by industry custom. There is robust custom 
with respect to the terms normally included in each product subcategory; it is 
expressed in so-called settlement matrices. A settlement matrix lists, among other 
things, the credit events normally used in Western European Sovereign, Japanese 
                                                                                                                                               
49  For example, a bank might not be in a position to cut lending to a client with which it has a 
valuable relationship, but it can reduce its effective exposure to the credit risk by buying a CDS. 
For an example of managing apparently correlated risks, see, e.g., AON Financial Products v. 
Société Générale, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 2488 (CDS on the Philippine sovereign bought to hedge 
against the risk of default by a parastatal). 
50  See, e.g., A. Fontana and M. Scheicher, ‘An Analysis of Euro Area Sovereign CDS and 
Their Relation with Government Bonds’, ECB Working Paper No. 1271 (December 2010), 
available at: <http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1271.pdf.>. 
51  See, e.g., Stulz, supra n. 46; J. Ericsson, K. Jacobs and R. Oviedo, ‘The Determinants of 
Credit Default Swap Premia’, 44 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (February 2009) 
p. 109. 
52  See, e.g., D. Duffie, ‘Credit Swap Valuation’, Financial Analysts Journal (January/ 
February 1999) p. 73. 
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Corporate or US Municipal CDS markets. For example, most corporate CDS 
include Bankruptcy, Failure to Pay and versions of Restructuring as credit events; 
for sovereign CDS, the credit events are Failure to Pay, Repudiation/Moratorium, 
and Restructuring. We discuss these in more detail as they come up in our case 
study. 
Whether particular events trigger payout under ISDA documentation is a 
question of interpretation. The task of interpretation involves establishing whether 
the language in the Definitions fits with available information about a credit event 
(for example, a missed payment). For a tradable instrument, such information 
should be readily verifiable by third parties: it would be hard to market a contract 
whose payout relied on private knowledge. It follows that even if an authoritative 
interpretation of a CDS credit event came out of a bilateral dispute, it would 
presumptively bind the market as a whole, because it concerns the application of 
highly uniform contract terms to publicly available facts. 
3.3 Big Bang 
The derivatives market survived the US government takeover of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac and the failures of large financial institutions on both sides of the 
Atlantic without major disruptions. Nevertheless, it quickly became clear that 
financial reforms the world over would bring about more regulation of derivatives, 
most likely in the form of mandatory central clearing.53 In turn, the onset of central 
clearing required a quick response to some known shortcomings with CDS 
settlement and interpretation. The result was more standardisation and formalisation 
– and tighter coordination with government regulators. In response to prompting 
from the US President’s Working Group on derivatives, ISDA’s ‘Big Bang 
Protocol’ made auctions for CDS credit events the default settlement method 
beginning in March 2009. Where in the past, parties might have scrambled to find 
defaulted securities to deliver in exchange for their CDS payout, auctions would 
facilitate cash settlement by establishing market prices for deliverable obligations 
and the net payments due. The new settlement process would also ensure that 
dealers and central counterparties who bought and sold protection at the same time 
faced symmetrical risks. These market participants entered into multiple contracts 
designed to cancel out one another’s risk; but their role depended on consistent 
interpretation of the contracts. If this could not be assured, the dealer or clearing 
house faced legal ‘basis risk’: it might find itself paying out on some CDS but 
unable to collect on the offsetting ones. 
Expanding the auction mechanism thus raised the problem of contract 
interpretation anew. Before the Big Bang, if contract counterparties disagreed 
whether a ‘credit event’ had occurred and a CDS payout obligation had been 
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triggered, they could try to settle the question informally, or go to court – and some 
did.54 Individual market participants could also opt in or out of auctions after the 
credit event had occurred. Interpretive questions were decided ad hoc, usually after 
the adverse event but before the auction; market participants could then decide 
whether to opt into the auction or go their bilateral ways. Now that most would go 
to auction, ISDA needed ‘a formal, objective process for resolving auction-related 
determinations’.55 
Thus emerged five Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees, each assigned 
a geographic region. Unlike traditional adjudicative bodies, the DCs do not resolve 
party disputes based on adversarial submissions. Instead, they answer standard-form 
questions posed by market participants, who choose the questions from a limited 
menu. Common questions include whether a credit event has occurred within the 
meaning of Credit Derivatives Definitions, whether an auction should be held, and 
what obligations may be delivered into such an auction. DC membership includes ten 
CDS dealers (firms that stand ready to buy and sell the contracts) and five non-
dealers. Dealers must meet aggregate trade volume criteria, which are described as 
proxy for market expertise; non-dealers are subject to minimum size requirements. 
ISDA serves as DC secretariat. The DCs are also advised by a law firm working with 
ISDA, but not on behalf of a particular party. DC decisions require an 80% 
supermajority vote of the 15-member committee. The threshold is designed to signal 
consensus and non-dealer inclusion. If no supermajority is reached, the question is 
referred to External Review, which is more like traditional arbitration, including 
trained lawyers as adjudicators, adversarial submissions and arguments by law firms 
on behalf of ISDA members.56 In May 2012, ISDA reported that unanimous decisions 
were reached for 96% of the 900 questions referred to its DCs; only one case was 
referred to External Review. DC decisions, including member votes, but not panel 
reasoning, are published on the ISDA website. 
Although they are routinely conflated, the DCs are distinct from ISDA itself. 
DC members serve on behalf of their firms and may be motivated by these firms’ 
respective private agendas. However, assuming the process works as advertised, 
DC decisions over time should track ISDA preferences. If DC members have 
limited opportunity to cherry-pick cases or ‘vote their book’, they have few 
incentives to invest in individual disputes: they make money from trading 
derivatives, not judging cases. While DC members rotate, ISDA serves as 
secretariat in each case; moreover, each case concerns the viability of the contracts 
and contracting model that are at the heart of its mission. And if market participants 
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55  Ibid. 
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believe that ISDA and the lawyers it hires are expert and impartial, it makes sense 
for DC members to defer to ISDA’s judgment on the meaning of its standard-form 
contracts. No other actor has a bigger stake in a consistent stream of robust 
interpretations. To be sure, if the assumptions of process integrity, trust and 
impartiality are far off the mark, our analysis must be qualified. For most of this 
article, we proceed with the assumptions intact; we revisit them in the conclusion. 
DC interpretations are binding on the parties to ISDA contracts. A large subset of 
derivatives market participants, including all major regulated institutions, ‘voluntarily 
expressed their commitment to auction hardwiring in public letters to regulators’.57 
Once the major dealers signed up to the new settlement and interpretation process, 
opting out became costly for non-dealers even if they themselves were unregulated. 
Binding force is formally achieved through market participants’ contractual 
commitment in the Big Bang Protocol to settle their CDS through ISDA auctions. As 
a practical matter, then, market actors refusing to abide by the DC process or rulings 
may face lawsuits from their contract counterparties, unspecified supervisory 
response from financial regulators, and a mix of formal and reputational sanctions in 
the industry, including banishment from future DC deliberations.58 
ISDA’s description of the DCs’ interpretive approach comes across, at first 
blush, as contextualist. DC members, bound by contract to follow DC rules 
(including elaborate conflict of interest safeguards), are expected to perform their 
obligations ‘in a commercially reasonable manner’. Although ‘DC members do not 
have the discretion to disregard the terms of the contract’, they are ‘sensitive to the 
broader context of the CDS market and are able to draw on their experience and 
expertise to take a more purposive interpretation of the Credit Derivatives 
Definitions than a court might’.59 
The contextualist mission itself comes in a broader context. ISDA’s early 
involvement in public CDS litigation was decidedly textualist: faced with a lower 
court interpreting its contracts as the economic equivalent of insurance, ISDA 
intervened and secured a strict construction of its text on appeal.60 On another 
occasion, which we elaborate later in the article, ISDA effectively admitted that a 
court had uncovered an ambiguity in its contract, and proceeded to redraft it so it 
was less susceptible to multiple readings and less prone to contextual inquiry.61 In 
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both cases, contract standardisation gave the court rulings significance far beyond 
the disputes at hand. 
Against this background (and quite apart from the needs of the auction 
mechanism), taking adjudication private could be viewed as a way of pre-empting 
uninformed contextualism on the part of the lay judiciary, in the name of the 
broader CDS market. It also dispensed with the problem of siding with one member 
against another in public contract disputes. Early on, ISDA would not intervene in 
disputes between members; this position was becoming harder to maintain as it 
sought to grow and diversify its membership beyond the dealer core, as courts 
looked likely to rule on more issues of market-wide significance, and with the 
looming prospect of regulation. 
Nevertheless, once adjudication migrated out of the judiciary, there was no reason 
to doubt the DCs’ contextualist promise. By taking over credit event determinations 
in a process with reasonably credible safeguards against systematic dealer bias,62 
ISDA dispensed with some of the more important arguments for textualism. Investors 
could now invest in the knowledge that their counterparties had no scope for 
manipulating trigger and payout decisions, misrepresenting their true intent, or the 
contracting circumstances.63 The DCs were free to issue contextualist rulings 
reflecting market expectations and the economics of credit risk transfer. 
Such contextualism could, in turn, help guard against the risk of manipulation 
that resided outside the derivatives contract. If payout determinations were made on 
the basis of contract text alone, a debtor referenced in a CDS contract but not party 
to it could try to default and restructure in substance, but not in form, so as not to 
trigger the bets on its default and restructuring. If the debtor succeeded, it would 
make fools of the gamblers’ contracts as they stood by, helpless to affect the 
outcome. But why would any debtor do it? And would ISDA DCs, with their 
market expertise and discretion to call it like it is, guard against such debtor 
opportunism? 
4. SOVEREIGN CHICKENS COME HOME TO ROOST 
4.1 Bright lines in grey zones 
From the start, sovereign CDS presented tricky drafting and interpretation 
problems. Although they have always been a small part of the CDS market, and 
although lawsuits over CDS contract interpretation were rare even before ISDA 
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DCs, sovereign CDS figured prominently in the early disputes. This puzzle may be 
due to the fact that CDS, like bond insurance, is a bright-line instrument – whereas 
sovereign debt distress is an unusually grey zone. 
When corporate debtors run into trouble, they might stop paying their debts, file 
for bankruptcy, or restructure their debts in bankruptcy’s shadow. In any case, they 
stand a real chance of ending up in court, which can make them pay. A sovereign 
debtor cannot file for bankruptcy protection – nor can it be compelled to pay, or 
turn over its property to creditors. This is because in most cases, sovereign property 
outside its borders is immune; property inside the country is effectively 
unreachable. To be sure, there are many ways in which determined creditors can 
bully weak governments into paying them, but this is a far cry from the relatively 
straightforward world of commercial debt enforcement.64 If a sovereign is able to 
borrow from its own citizens or under its own laws, its repertoire of debt 
management options expands in proportion to the power it wields at home. On the 
other hand, debt moratoria and outright government defaults tend to bankrupt 
domestic banking systems and cause extreme disruptions in the financial markets. 
As a result, formal moratoria and defaults have become rare. Government debt 
troubles end in restructuring operations usually described by oxymoronic 
euphemisms like ‘quasi-voluntary’, ‘moral suasion’, and ‘Private Sector 
Involvement’ (or PSI).65 
A binary mechanism of the sort embedded in a CDS instrument is not good at 
handling oxymorons and euphemisms. For example, consider how one might draft 
a payout trigger to distinguish between the following scenarios: 
– A government comes to its creditors, hat in hand, and says: ‘I had a bad 
hurricane season, and have no money to pay you. Would you stretch out the 
maturities on my bonds by a couple of years?’ The creditors might say no, and 
face the prospect of default and chasing the government’s assets around the 
globe for a decade.66 – or they might say yes, and extend the maturities, hoping 
for the best. 
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– A different government approaches another set of creditors, and says: ‘We all 
know that I am much better off now than I was when you first lent me the 
money. I could of course refinance this debt cheaply in the markets, but we 
might both benefit by extending the maturities a bit.’ The creditors agree. 
In both cases, the government has restructured its debt on terms more favourable 
than before. In both cases, creditors have consented to amending the obligations 
they hold because that was the best choice for them under the circumstances; they 
are free at all times to reject the government’s terms. A variant on the two scenarios 
might involve the sovereign going into the market and exchanging old debt for new 
debt with more favourable terms. In the hurricane hypothetical, the government 
expressly or implicitly threatens default, but does not actually default. Did either set 
of creditors suffer a ‘Restructuring Credit Event’ under a CDS contract? 
Common sense would suggest that where the sovereign wants to reprofile its 
debt because its financial condition has improved, there should be no credit event – 
otherwise the CDS instrument would turn into insurance against good states of the 
world. If CDS prices are to convey information about the underlying credit quality, 
the CDS contract must be written to trigger only when the amendment, or the debt 
exchange, comes about because the debtor’s condition has worsened. An early 
version of sovereign CDS definitions, which expressly contemplated debt 
exchanges, attempted to solve this problem by reference to the creditors’ state of 
mind: if the exchange were voluntary, there would be no credit event; if it were 
mandatory, payout would be due. 
This formulation created more problems than it solved. ‘Mandatory transfer’ in 
ISDA 1999 Credit Derivatives Definitions.67 was not a rule, but a standard, and one 
that turned out to be notoriously hard to apply. Courts started having trouble 
administering this standard right away, when Argentina technically secured some 
creditors’ assent to restructuring in late 2001, even as it left them deeply unhappy.68 
The industry responded with bright-line rules in the form of a contract revision, the 
2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions, produced with input from eminent 
derivatives and sovereign debt lawyers in New York and London.69 
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Under the new regime, a Restructuring Credit Event would be deemed to occur 
if one of the following three categories of bad things befell the underlying 
obligations, and did so in a form ‘binding on all’ holders of such obligations: 
– A change in payment terms, defined as a reduction in the rate of interest or 
amount of principal payable (colloquially known as a ‘haircut’); or a deferral of 
payment of interest or principal; 
– A change in ranking that results in subordination; or 
– A change in currency: a change in the currency of payment to a currency that is 
not legal tender in a G7 country or an AAA-rated OECD country.70 
The crucial shift was from the apparently inadministrable standard (‘mandatory’) to 
a bright-line rule (‘binding on all’). Lawyers involved in the drafting of the 2003 
Definitions report that ‘binding on all’ was indeed conceived of as a rule, meant to 
cover two scenarios: first, when a government amends its domestic-law debt by 
statute or decree, and second, when a supermajority of creditors under the relevant 
obligation vote to amend it, and by their vote bind the dissenting minority. The 
revised Definitions track this account. They trigger if the adverse change ‘occurs’, 
‘is agreed’ between the debtor and ‘a sufficient number of holders’, or ‘is 
announced (or otherwise decreed)’ by the debtor or ‘a Governmental Authority’, in 
all cases in a form that binds all creditors. From now on, no court would have to 
inquire into the creditors’ volition. By implication, arm-twisting and threats of 
default without recourse that did not legally bind all creditors – but brought about 
the same economic result – did not amount to a credit event. 
This new definition of Restructuring was supposed to make sovereign CDS 
interpretation more predictable and transparent. It also made it narrow and 
acontextual. Most modern-day sovereign restructurings up to that point had used 
neither statutory nor contractual amendment to secure debt relief.71 They relied on a 
threat of non-payment, made credible by the remaining protections of sovereign 
immunity.72 Good sovereign restructuring practice was to make the threat just 
vague enough not to count as repudiation (an event of default under the debt 
contracts, as well as a CDS trigger), but few were fooled. Creditors rarely ignored 
statements such as ‘Regrettably, we cannot assure sufficient funds …’. Ironically, 
because so many heeded the warning, the few remaining holdouts were often paid 
off quietly after the rest had restructured. Obscure and byzantine, verging on 
                                                                                                                                               
70  Ibid. 
71  F. Sturzenegger and J. Zettelmeyer, Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises 
(Massachusetts, MIT Press 2006); U. Panizza, et al., ‘The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt 
and Default’, 47 Journal of Economic Literature (2009) p. 1. 
72  M. Gulati and J. Zettelmeyer, ‘Making a Voluntary Greek Debt Exchange Work’, 7 
Capital Markets Law Journal (2012) p. 169 (defining a voluntary exchange as one without the 
customary threat of default). 
CDS Zombies 369
perverse, the process seemed to work: by 2003, a handful of countries had secured 
deep debt relief with more than 90% creditor participation.73 Barring dramatic 
change in this way of managing sovereign debt distress, the new improved Credit 
Derivatives Definition would cover a small and uncertain category of events. 
In 2003, there was good reason to think that sovereign restructuring practice 
would indeed change – and the people involved in revising ISDA’s CDS definitions 
were at the forefront of that change. 
The sovereign CDS market emerged in the 1990s, just as the large developing 
economies that were its principal reference entities shifted their international 
borrowing from loans to tradable bonds. Roughly half of these bonds were issued 
under New York law and, by market convention, required unanimous consent of the 
bondholders to amend the terms. In contrast, bonds issued under English law could 
be amended with a supermajority vote of the creditors, binding the minority. Policy 
makers in wealthy G-7 countries feared that New York’s unanimity requirement 
would impede sovereign debt restructuring in the next crisis and cause developing 
countries and their bondholders to demand bailouts from Washington and Brussels. 
The solution was either statutory sovereign bankruptcy – which did not have 
enough political support.74 – or a change in market practice favouring supermajority 
amendment and other provisions to promote bondholder collective action in New 
York law bonds. The market practice shifted to such ‘collective action clauses’ 
(CACs) in 2003, at about the same time as ISDA was amending its Credit 
Derivatives Definitions.75 Within a few years, nearly all developing country bonds 
governed by foreign law permitted creditor supermajorities to bind holdouts in a 
restructuring. 
If the international officials and the leading sovereign restructuring lawyers 
were right and the inclusion of CACs in sovereign debt contracts would prompt 
sovereigns and their creditors to use them each time they needed debt relief, then 
the new improved sovereign CDS contracts would finally track the newly 
standardised management of sovereign distress. The signs from the developing 
world were encouraging: before the decade was up, Belize and the Seychelles had 
restructured their foreign debt stocks using CACs; several bigger countries used the 
clauses to restructure isolated bond issues. 
But like Tolstoy’s unhappy families, every sovereign debt crisis unfolds in its 
own unhappy way. 
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4.2 Greece 
The Greek debt crisis began in late 2009. A newly elected government told the 
world that its predecessors had cooked the books. Greece’s debt and deficit reality 
was far worse than the figures it had reported to Brussels.76 Greece was in a deep 
fiscal crisis and in breach of its EU Treaty commitments. However, Greece was 
also a wealthy country that used the euro as its currency and issued most of its debt 
under Greek law. The locus of sovereign restructuring and sovereign CDS shifted 
from the international debt of developing countries, which accounted for a little 
over $600 billion, or 1% of all outstanding government securities, to the domestic 
debt of developed countries, which stood at over $30 trillion, or 84%.77 The stakes 
for the rich countries and the global financial system suddenly went up 
astronomically. 
Eurozone government debt had become a ‘safe asset’ in many parts of the 
world. It competed with the US dollar in its money-like qualities as a global store of 
value and medium of exchange. To the policy makers vested in this status of the 
euro – in Brussels, but especially at the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt 
– allowing default on eurozone debt would be akin to debasing money, a first step 
on the sure road to perdition. A ‘credit event’ under Greek CDS both symbolised 
default and threatened a cascade of failures across the European financial system 
still reeling from the 2007-2008 crisis. Because officials did not know who had 
bought or sold the CDS contracts, the path of such a cascade was highly uncertain. 
More subtly, a sharp and visible drop in the status of Greek debt, such as a CDS 
trigger or a ‘Default’ credit rating, would force hard decisions about the ECB’s own 
holdings of Greek debt, and its policy of lending against Greek government debt to 
the Greek banking sector. On the one hand, taking losses on its sovereign debt 
holdings and lending against demonstrably bad assets would be a blow to the 
bank’s credibility. On the other hand, cutting off Greek banks from the ECB lifeline 
would be tantamount to pushing them and the Greek economy off the cliff, 
cancelling any benefit from debt relief. 
In short, allowing Greece to restructure its debt along the lines contemplated in 
the CDS contracts on Greek bonds was unthinkable. The obvious alternative was to 
give Greece the money to pay. This was equally unthinkable, both because such a 
transfer appeared to violate EU Treaties and, more importantly, because the public 
elsewhere in Europe was not prepared to finance Greece and its creditors. These 
uniquely European imperatives took Greece back to the old grey zone of quasi-
voluntary sovereign restructuring and PSI. Greece had to get debt relief, but in a 
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way that did not trigger a CDS credit event or a cascade of credit ratings 
downgrades.78 By mid-2011, this meant most likely a formally voluntary debt 
exchange spurred on by a mix of veiled threats and backdoor regulatory sweeteners 
for the European banks and insurance companies that comprised the bulk of the 
creditor base.79 
4.3 The prospect of a voluntary trim 
When European policy makers conceded that some form of PSI was necessary in 
late 2010, Greece and the EU leaders publicly insisted that any debt relief operation 
would be voluntary: creditors would not be threatened with default. This put Greece 
in a more difficult position than its developing country predecessors. The latter had 
not been burdened with the need to preserve the value of the dollar or the euro they 
had borrowed; no one would infer trouble for the US dollar from Uruguay’s default. 
As a result, Uruguay could dolefully point to its neighbour Argentina to help its 
creditors see the light. If Greece pointed to Argentina, it would be accused of 
imperilling the euro. 
Behind the scenes, discussions between Greece’s European backers and the 
Institute of International Finance (IIF), which came to speak for the institutional 
creditors in the debt talks, apparently produced consensus around a voluntary 
operation, which would result in a net present value reduction (haircut) of 20% on 
Greek bonds.80 The talks culminated in a joint announcement by euro area heads of 
state, heads of government, and EU institutions, concerning new measures from the 
official sector and a private sector contribution: 
The financial sector has indicated its willingness to support Greece on a 
voluntary basis through a menu of options further strengthening overall 
sustainability. The net contribution of the private sector is estimated at 37 billion 
euro. … Credit enhancement will be provided to underpin the quality of 
collateral so as to allow its continued use for access to Eurosystem liquidity 
operations by Greek banks. We will provide adequate resources to recapitalise 
Greek banks if needed.81 
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The IIF posted a detailed ‘Financing Offer’ on its website, including a menu of 
options and terms for two par and two discount bonds to be offered in exchange for 
outstanding Greek debt, and a list of over forty institutions ‘in support’ of the 
proposal.82 To be sure, Greece had not accepted the IIF offer, nor had it made a 
formal offer of its own to the creditors, and no changes had been made to the terms 
of Greek bonds. But under the circumstances, it appeared that the relevant decision-
makers – EU officials and big financial institutions – had come to agreement and 
were marketing a deal. 
The marketing campaign brought up two questions, which turned out to be 
related. The first was how and why the creditors would voluntarily take less than 
they were owed in the largest sovereign restructuring to date. The second was 
whether, if consummated, the restructuring would trigger the CDS contracts. In 
substance, the 20% haircut would be a substantial realisation of Greek sovereign 
credit risk, whether it was suffered under protest, accepted with resignation, or 
granted lovingly in a bout of patriotic fervour. The legal answer could be more 
complicated: the 2003 Credit Derivatives Definitions said that a Restructuring 
Credit Event would occur if the underlying debt contracts were amended, and if the 
amendment were ‘binding on all’ holders of the relevant bonds. Europe had 
expressly ruled out the possibility of binding anyone when it promised a voluntary 
operation in Greece, and openly justified its approach by the need to avoid CDS 
triggers. 
But Greece had other ways of prodding its creditors in the right direction. 
Unlike the previously restructured developing country bonds and the covenant-
laden debt which Greece had issued in the past, over 90% of Greek sovereign bonds 
outstanding at the onset of the crisis had been issued under Greek law. After Greece 
joined the eurozone, investors started buying its term-free Greek-law bonds much 
as they would Germany’s term-free German-law bonds. Greece’s local law bonds 
had no CACs, nor did they have clauses barring new secured borrowing, 
withholding taxes, or any other mischief that could effectively wipe out their value 
to the creditors. Under an old foreign-law bond, pledging collateral or imposing 
punitive taxes without compensation would have let the creditors accelerate 
(demand full repayment). When Greece failed to pay the accelerated amounts, 
creditors could be left out in the cold – but would collect on their CDS. None of this 
had to happen to make the voluntary PSI deal work. Greece could make holdout 
debt worthless without threatening non-payment, triggering an event of default on 
the bonds or a CDS credit event. The offer of performing debt at 20% off would be 
attractive by comparison. 
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In 2011, Greece and Europe were unwilling to take advantage of this contractual 
windfall, perhaps because they had other options. At the time PSI was mooted, 
Greek debt was still held primarily by large regulated financial institutions – banks, 
insurance companies and pension funds in Greece and elsewhere in Europe.83 Such 
institutions are famously susceptible to ‘moral suasion’, supervisory and accounting 
incentives.84 During the Third World Debt Crisis of the 1980s, banks were 
persuaded to renew loans and ultimately (if belatedly) to grant substantial debt 
reduction, with no or minimal resort to default or legal compulsion.85 Similarly, 
Greece and Europe had extra-contractual ways of extracting debt relief from 
Greece’s creditors, so long as large regulated firms continued to dominate the 
creditor body. These ways were hardly a state secret: market participants openly 
discussed regulatory incentives such as favourable collateral treatment for 
restructured debt, and corresponding penalties for holdouts.86 
In sum, if Greece and Europe wanted to reduce Greek debt by 20% without 
formally binding a single creditor or threatening non-payment, they had ample 
sticks and carrots to do so. All along, officials could claim that the exchange was 
voluntary, and more to the point, easily avoid triggering CDS – but only if ISDA 
DCs stuck to the letter of the contract. 
The voluntary deal never came to fruition for reasons unrelated to the law. The 
Greek economy deteriorated so quickly that it made the admittedly optimistic terms 
look paltry overnight; they were nowhere near enough to put Greece on a 
sustainable debt path. As a result, we do not know for sure what an ISDA DC 
would have said had the operation proceeded as planned. However, the episode was 
significant in two ways. First, it illuminated a credible path to restructuring even 
within the peculiar parameters dictated by European politics. Second, the avalanche 
of press speculation about what might happen to the CDS prompted ISDA to offer a 
preview of its thinking. 
Shortly before the terms of the 20% exchange were made public in July 2011, 
ISDA posted ‘Greek Sovereign Debt Q&A’, where it sought to describe the DC 
process and the criteria for a Restructuring Credit Event, including the ‘binding on 
all’ element. ISDA updated the Q&A and issued a press release in late October. 
While noting that it was too early for a DC to rule on an exchange proposal, ISDA 
went out on a limb to observe: ‘Based on what we know it appears from 
preliminary news reports that the bond restructuring is voluntary and not binding on 
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all bondholders. As such, it does not appear to be likely that the restructuring will 
trigger payments under existing CDS contracts.’87 
Although ISDA had issued interpretive releases of this sort in the past,88 doing 
so pre-emptively against the background of admittedly high uncertainty, and with 
such high stakes, seemed extraordinary. The statement could not have been made 
without consulting with – perhaps even some prodding from – at least some of the 
membership, European officials, and outside counsel called upon to advise the DCs. 
The statement was also curious in substance. For example, it illustrated the ‘binding 
on all’ criterion with a description of voting under CACs, yet also noted that 
‘Greece’s domestic law debt, which accounts for over 90% of all of its outstanding 
debt, does not contain CAC clauses’ [sic]. Perhaps most importantly, ISDA 
confirmed that even a distressed debt exchange ‘typically would not trigger a Credit 
Event’ because it did not involve amendment of the underlying contract. Recalling 
our earlier hypothetical, because most sovereign debt restructurings proceed 
through debt exchanges, and because CDS contracts have no way of distinguishing 
a distressed exchange from one prompted by an improvement in the debtor’s 
finances, CDS contracts have no ‘hook’ into the dominant mode of sovereign 
restructuring. 
In sum, in the second half of 2011, ISDA faced the prospect of a debt exchange 
most likely achievable by making holdout bonds worthless using contract and 
regulation. This was entirely consistent with the way in which most sovereign debt 
had been restructured in the recent past.89 By its own admission, ISDA did not have 
to rule on the matter until a restructuring actually happened. Instead, it took the 
opportunity to articulate an emphatically narrow reading of its CDS contracts, 
which hinged on the words ‘binding on all’. Doubling down on the distinction 
between contract text and economic context, ISDA’s Q&A observed: 
‘Economically they [exchange and amendment] may be the same but legally they 
are different, which could have very different consequences for CDS.’90 This was 
fair enough, but left unanswered a fundamental question: what was the economic 
function of sovereign CDS, thus framed by ISDA’s contracts? This question would 
come up repeatedly in the ensuing months. 
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4.4 Collateral murmurs 
The 21 July package of measures, including the IIF-led private sector involvement, 
began unravelling soon after it was announced. The Greek economy continued to 
decline, along with the government’s political capacity to abide by the policy 
conditions for external official support. But one seemingly minor portion of the 
package stuck: Finland, representing about 2% of EU official financing for Greece, 
demanded and later secured collateral for its participation.91 The demand was partly 
a function of complex Finnish coalition politics; Europe’s acquiescence was likely 
due to the combination of Finland’s financial insignificance and the political 
importance of projecting European unity. However, once the Finnish deal became 
public, several other eurozone countries felt compelled to demand collateral for 
their citizens as well, though none have gone as far as Finland. 
By mid-2011, nearly every turn in the Greek saga prompted speculation about 
CDS triggers and ratings downgrades. The Finnish collateral deal was no exception 
for a mix of economic, legal and political reasons. Economically, granting one set 
of creditors collateral effectively reduces the stock of assets from which the rest 
could get paid. That is why bonds have so-called negative pledge clauses, which 
typically bar the debtor from pledging collateral for future borrowing unless the 
bonds are proportionately secured. It seemed quite plausible at the time that 
someone holding one of the few term-heavy English-law bonds issued by Greece 
would try to claim that the Finnish deal violated their negative pledge clause.92 
However, CDS contracts would not trigger on negative pledge violations: these 
would constitute covenant defaults not normally included in credit event 
definitions, even though the economics of granting collateral to Finland amounted 
to constructive subordination of Greece’s unsecured creditors. 
Given ISDA’s declared reluctance to trigger credit events based on the 
economic effect of a debt management operation,93 it was perhaps no surprise that 
Finland’s move to the head of the creditor line elicited no response from the 
Determinations Committees. However, one might have expected more of a debate 
about the degree to which existing CDS credit events reflect economic harms that 
might befall a bondholder. Bonds, after all, have both negative pledge and ranking 
covenants. There is no apparent rationale for CDS to have subordination, but not 
negative pledge triggers, especially since the two serve parallel economic functions. 
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Incidentally, credit rating agencies did not feel ISDA’s constraints. Moody’s 
warned that the Finnish collateral arrangement exacerbated political obstacles to 
EU financing for Greece and threatened the viability of the rescue package, further 
weakening the outlook for Greece.94 
4.5 Retro-CACs 
By early 2012, everyone had long given up on the voluntary 20% debt relief 
operation; the new consensus came closer to 70% debt relief, and the subject of 
coercion resurfaced. Still, Europe was unwilling to countenance default. However, 
compared to the threat of outright default or unilateral amendment, CACs – the 
contract clauses that allowed supermajority amendment – began to look attractive. 
There was a collaborative feel to this contractual mechanism, which also benefited 
from a long and close association with official sector policies promoting ‘orderly 
sovereign restructurings’. But the bulk of Greek debt, term-free and governed by 
Greek law, had no CACs. 
Greece’s lawyers had an ingenious solution: the government would enact a 
statute retroactively ‘inserting’ CACs in its domestic-law debt. Once it had done so, 
it could try to secure the consent of a bondholder majority to its preferred 
restructuring terms, and bind any holdouts. In February 2012, the Greek 
Bondholder Act cleared the parliament. Under its terms, creditors holding half of 
roughly €180 billion of Greece’s local-law debt by face value constituted a quorum, 
and two thirds of the quorum could vote to amend the entire stock of this debt 
binding the rest.95 
While ingenious, this statutory solution had little in common with its contractual 
namesake. The original CACs were, by definition, consensual – agreed by the 
creditors ex ante either when the bond was issued or when they bought the bond. 
This consensual nature of CACs was such a powerful part of their image that some 
leading observers, including drafters of a European Commission report in 
December 2010, had mistakenly concluded that using CACs to bind holdouts 
should not trigger a CDS credit event.96 After all, how could an amendment mecha-
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nism to which creditors (including would-be holdouts) had freely acceded be 
deemed coercive? ISDA’s fall 2011 releases cleared up this technical point, using 
CACs as the prime example of a restructuring trigger event,97 but did not dispel the 
halo of approval and implied consent around CACs. 
The Greek Bondholder Act was, in form and substance, the opposite of traditional 
contractual CACs. It was a unilateral statutory modification of debt contracts, much 
as a straight-up amendment of the payment terms or a punitive withholding tax might 
have been. Its only connection with CACs was that it gave some bondholders some 
voice over what happened with the lot. But even in this respect, Greece’s ‘Retro-
CAC’ was quite unlike the contract standard: it used a lower voting threshold and 
applied across the aggregated Greek-law stock. In the case of Greece’s English-law 
bonds, the amendment vote would proceed issue by issue, and individual bond issues 
could vote against restructuring and drop out. The combination of low voting 
thresholds and aggregation meant that a few big issues held by Greek banks could 
seal the deal for 90% of the debt in an eventual restructuring. 
Here, for the first time, was an event that might fit the elusive ‘binding on all’ 
requirement of the Credit Derivatives Definitions: it was a blanket, mandatory 
change in the bond terms that set them up for shabby treatment by the debtor. On 
the other hand, the insertion of Retro-CACs did not effect principal or interest 
reduction but only made it easier for Greece to do it later. Greece had not yet 
deployed this tool, and might not need to, if merely threatening to do it would 
secure quasi-voluntary participation in a debt exchange. Though Greek bondholder 
fortunes had taken a clear turn for the worse, they did not meet the conditions for 
CDS protection payouts. ISDA’s DC said so on 1 March 2012, even as most 
observers said a credit event was imminent.98 
Was another interpretation available, one that reflected the newly vulnerable 
status of the Greek-law bonds relative to their English-law counterparts? Perhaps a 
DC might have called the insertion of Retro-CACs a subordination, a reduction in 
status of the bonds affected by the Greek Bondholder Act, which like the Finnish 
collateral incident, reduced their chances of getting paid. Such a decision might 
have better reflected the economics and politics of the situation. Going forward, it 
would have reduced the scope for debtor opportunism: a law that reduced or even 
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Isnt-It-Yet-a-Credit-Event-BR-030212.pdf>; see also F. Salmon, ‘Worrying About Greece’s CDS 
for the Wrong Reasons’, Reuters, 2 March 2012, available at: <http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2012/03/02/worrying-about-greeces-cds-for-the-wrong-reasons>. 
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eviscerated the value of the bonds without formally changing the payment terms 
would now have legal consequences for the CDS. After all, the only scenario in 
which Greece would not use its Retro-CACs to change payment terms was one 
where most of its creditors gave up most of what was due to them merely for fear 
that Retro-CACs would be used. Late 2011, ISDA releases already said that there 
would be no credit event in such a nominally voluntary exchange. Why not use the 
remaining interpretive flexibility to sanction the mandatory term change that 
enabled future coercion? 
The incentives for derivatives counterparties would not change; they do not 
control the sovereign. But ISDA DCs would have to engage in a more contextual 
inquiry about whether retroactive legislation in fact made things worse for a 
sovereign’s bondholders. ISDA would lose the benefit of one bright-line test (a 
change in payment terms), though it would keep another (‘binding on all’). The 
advantage of better capturing the economic and political context of a sovereign debt 
crisis would come at a cost of more interpretive uncertainty, more work and more 
political pressure on ISDA at the back end of a transaction. Governments already 
anxious about the effect of sovereign CDS on their debt markets would lose some 
control over credit event triggers, and would have to look to ISDA’s case-by-case 
judgments about the effects of their laws and regulations. Under the circumstances, 
it was far preferable for ISDA DCs to stick with the text, even at the cost of 
criticism from some powerful constituents.99 
4.6 The ECB swap 
Subordination is normally part of the Restructuring definition for corporate and 
sovereign CDS alike, but its operation in sovereign CDS is something of a mystery. 
When a corporation is liquidated in bankruptcy, its assets are distributed in the 
contractual and statutory order of priorities – senior debt is first, equity last; 
subordinated debt is in between. This order of distribution may also serve as a test 
of fairness for bankruptcy reorganisation, and structures incentives in out-of-court 
restructuring. But sovereigns cannot file for bankruptcy, are never liquidated and 
therefore cannot readily articulate an ‘absolute priority’ waterfall. To be sure, 
sovereigns routinely discriminate among their creditors,100 but, with a few notable 
exceptions,101 they assiduously avoid enshrining discrimination in contract or 
statute highlighting the gap between economic harm and a change in legal status. 
                                                                                                                                               
99  ‘Greek Debt Ruling Dangerous Precedent: PIMCO’s Gross’, Reuters, 1 March 2012, 
available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/us-greece-bonds-pimco-idUSTRE8201 
D920120301>. 
100  A. Gelpern, ‘Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings’, 53 Emory 
Law Review (2004) p. 1115; A. Gelpern and B. Setser, ‘Domestic and External Debt: The 
Doomed Quest for Equal Treatment’, 35 Georgetown Journal of International Law (2004) p. 795. 
101  Frankel, supra n. 66. 
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For over a decade, the meaning and implications of obligation status in 
sovereign debt have been furiously debated in the courts and in the academic 
literature.102 At the heart of the debate was a ubiquitous Latin clause (.pari passu, or 
‘in equal step’) that appeared to promise creditors equal treatment with similarly 
situated others.103 Without a bankruptcy filing and a bankruptcy estate, there was no 
agreement on what it took to breach the clause. Enacting a law that used the term 
‘subordination’ would surely do it, but no government enacted such a law in the 
real world. At one extreme, some debtors argued that failure to pay a subset of 
creditors for years, passing a law that prohibited payment to them, and disclosing in 
securities filings that the debt was non-payable, did not amount to subordination. At 
the other extreme, some creditors said that any selective non-payment was a 
reduction in status for those stiffed.104 Scholars found lawyers drafting the pari 
passu clause bafflingly incapable of articulating a coherent affirmative meaning;105 
doctrinal inquiry driven by creditor interests produced a similarly indeterminate 
outcome.106 
But for the CDS, this entire debate would have held little relevance for Greece, 
whose domestic debt had no pari passu covenants to uphold its legal status. 
Standard wording in Credit Derivatives Definitions made Subordination a 
Restructuring Credit Event, unless the parties bothered to exclude it. By all 
accounts, hardly any did.107 Now Greece was facing a big subordination problem, 
bigger than Finnish collateral and the purported effects of its Retro-CAC law. 
About a quarter of the total debt stock Greece had sought to restructure was held 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) and other European central banks, which had 
come to hold it as a result of crisis response programmes launched in May 2010 and 
                                                                                                                                               
102  See, e.g., W.W. Bratton, ‘Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign’s Rational Choices’, 53 
Emory Law Journal (2004) p. 823; L.C. Buchheit and J.S. Pam, ‘The Pari Passu Clause in 
Sovereign Debt Instruments’, 53 Emory Law Journal (2004) p. 869, at pp. 911-917; M. 
Weidemaier, R. Scott and M. Gulati, ‘Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu’, 
Law & Social Inquiry (forthcoming), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633439>; Frankel, 
supra n. 66. 
103  A clause might say, for example, ‘These obligations shall rank at all times pari passu with 
all other unsecured unsubordinated external indebtedness of the issuer.’ 
104  Hearing Transcript, NML Capital Ltd. v. Argentina, No. 12-105 (2d Circuit, 23 July, 
2012). 
105  Weidemaier, et al., supra n. 102. 
106  Bratton, supra n. 102. 
107  We see the reason is something of a puzzle, though we suspect that it might have 
something to do with the fact that including subordination was a strong default option: unless the 
market standard shifted, parties that excluded subordination would suffer a liquidity penalty. 
Apart from network effects, few protection buyers would give up protection against 
subordination, even if it were rare; and just as few protection sellers would fight against including 
it, especially if it were rare. Besides, the debate on pari passu clauses in sovereign debt 
documentation was complex and parochial, confined to relatively narrow emerging market 
sovereign debt circles. 
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other monetary and liquidity provision operations. The ECB took the view, 
accepted by the European leadership, that restructuring central banks’ Greek debt 
holdings would be tantamount to printing money in contravention of its Charter and 
European Treaties.108 To spare ECB and the Eurosystem the fate of its other 
bondholders, in February 2012 Greece swapped central bank-held bonds for new 
ones identical to the old in every respect, except identification numbers. Having 
thus segregated central bank holdings from the rest, Greece would omit the new 
identification numbers from the list of instruments invited – or bound – to take a 
haircut.109 At the same time, Greece exempted the new bonds from the ‘Retro-CAC’ 
law discussed in the preceding section. Did this contractual and legislative 
manoeuvre to separate one set of bonds from the rest, for the stated purpose of 
preferential treatment, count as Subordination under Greek CDS? 
After the ECB swap in February 2012, this question came before ISDA’s DC. 
Within days, the DC decided unanimously that no subordination, and therefore no 
credit event had occurred within the meaning of ISDA 2003 Credit Derivatives 
Definitions.110 Although the DC did not elaborate the grounds of its decision, ISDA 
pronouncements before and after the decision shed some light on its logic. Just as 
with the ‘Retro-CAC’ law, laying the groundwork for treating different obligations 
differently did not amount to differential treatment. No one had changed payment 
terms or missed a payment – yet. 
As in the case of ‘Retro-CACs’, the argument against triggering a credit event 
here is defensible. On paper, ECB and private bonds were different but equal. On 
the other hand, no one with even a passing knowledge of the situation had any 
doubt that the only rationale for the ECB swap was to treat its bonds better than 
those held by private creditors. Bloomberg’s ‘Breaking News’ segment announcing 
the ISDA decision highlighted the irony: ‘Last week Greece exchanged bonds with 
the ECB, giving the ECB seniority over others; it would not force the ECB to take 
losses. Somebody complained, took it to ISDA, and ISDA said, ‘No credit event.’111 
The report did not take issue with ISDA’s decision; instead, commentators 
observed that there was still time to trigger a credit event if and when someone did 
not get paid. But ‘Failure to Pay’ is a credit event distinct from Subordination. If, in 
fact, ECB had been given ‘seniority,’ waiting until non-payment would have made 
the Subordination trigger superfluous. 
                                                                                                                                               
108  European Central Bank, M. Draghi and V. Constâncio, Introductory Statement to the 
Press Conference (with Q&A) (9 February 2012), available at: <http://www.ecb.int/press/press 
conf/2012/html/is120209.en.html>. 
109  See J. Cotterill, ‘ECB Seniority and Dirty Hands’, Financial Times Alphaville, 7 February 
2012, available at: <http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2012/02/17/886061/ecb-seniority-and-dirty-
hands>. 
110  ISDA EMEA Determinations Committee, supra n. 98. 




Even in the murky world of sovereign priorities, it did not take a big contextual 
leap to conclude that creating a formally different class of debt for the publicly 
stated purpose of treating it better than the others, was effective subordination. It 
was not Subordination under ISDA’s Credit Derivatives Definitions. After the 
ISDA DC decision, the requirements for triggering a Subordination Credit Event 
remained as mysterious as the meaning of the pari passu clause. 
4.7 ‘Magic is might’ 
In the end, CDS protection buyers got lucky. Greece decided against using the 
leverage it had under local law to debase its bonds, and chose instead to use its 
statutory ‘Retro-CACs’ to amend the payment terms. Once the law was deployed, it 
bound the holders of over €177 billion in Greek bonds with the vote of just over 
€146 billion. At last, a Restructuring Credit Event was nigh – and ISDA’s DC 
agreed.112 Why Greece chose this route is still unclear. Perhaps it wanted the benefit 
of what legitimacy it could get from a CAC-style voting procedure with its 
rhetorical affinity to market practice. It is also possible that market pressure to 
allow the triggering of Greek CDS played a role, though anecdotal reports from 
those involved in the restructuring deny any such role. 
Once the decision to declare a credit event was made, ISDA was careful to 
collect formal evidence of the trigger. It took the position that the restructuring was 
not ‘binding on all’ until the Greek Cabinet had decided to use the ‘Retro-CACs’, 
the Bank of Greece announced the decision, and the decision was published in the 
Official Gazette. Because it took all day to publish the Greek government decision, 
the market spent several tense hours wondering whether the credit event would be 
called at all.113 
After the long-awaited credit event came to pass, the Greek CDS drama was far 
from over. Greek CDS holders now had to ensure that ISDA’s auction settlement 
mechanism, established with the Big Bang in 2009, would in fact compensate them 
for the reduction in the value of the underlying bonds. In theory, a CDS contract 
should pay the protection buyer the difference between the face value of the 
underlying bond and the recovery value on that bond after the restructuring. For 
example, if the old Greek bonds are worth 20% of their face value thanks to a credit 
event, then the holders of Greek CDS should be paid 80% of that face value. The 
sum of what they recover on the old bond and receive from their protection seller 
should, in theory, come to 100%. 
                                                                                                                                               
112  ISDA EMEA Determinations Committee, ‘Restructuring Credit Event Has Occurred with 
Respect to The Hellenic Republic (Greece)’ (9 March 2012), available at: <http://www2.isda.org/ 
greek-sovereign-cds>. 
113  Bloomberg TV, ‘ISDA’s Geen Says CDS Triggers Are Predefined, Technical,’ 12 March 
2012, available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/video/88138880-isda-s-geen-says-cds-triggers-
are-predefined-technical.html>. 
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Before auctions, CDS protection buyers would have to find defaulted bonds and 
deliver them to their protection sellers in exchange for payments equal to the full 
face value of the bonds. That way, the protection buyer got 100% and the protection 
seller took the loss on the bond. But because the amount of outstanding CDS need 
not match the amount of underlying debt, in some cases, a large number of CDS 
holders ended up chasing a small number of defaulted bonds, causing an artificial 
spike in their price. ISDA’s auction process was, in part, a response to this problem. 
A centralised auction maximises available liquidity in the defaulted bonds and 
helps establish their market price. Once the price was set, CDS counterparties could 
simply net their financial obligations; there was no need to find defaulted bonds. 
ISDA’s auction process assumed two background facts that did not hold in the 
Greek case and would not hold in many sovereign debt restructurings. First, it 
counted on default or amendment of the old bonds, which would remain available 
for delivery in the auction. In the Greek case, as in most sovereign restructurings, 
the measure ‘binding on all’ forced an exchange of the old bonds for new ones and 
the simultaneous cancellation of virtually all the old bonds. If Greece emerged with 
a sustainable debt burden, the new bonds would trade at a much higher fraction of 
their face value. Second, the auction mechanism was based on the assumption that 
the credit event would yield a single defaulted or amended obligation of the same 
issuer (here, Greece). However, from the dawn of modern sovereign restructuring 
practice in the 1980s, sovereigns have offered their creditors menus and packages 
of instruments to suit their economic, regulatory and accounting needs and thereby 
maximise participation in the debt exchange.114 In the 1980s and 1990s, and again 
in Greece in 2012, part of the creditors’ exit package might include instruments of 
other issuers, usually highly rated obligations such as the United States Treasury 
debt. Sovereign restructuring packages have also included contingent instruments, 
which might not have value at the outset but could deliver substantial payments if 
they were indexed to the debtor’s economic growth or the price of oil. Contingent 
instruments give the creditors something analogous to an equity stake in the 
sovereign’s economic performance. 
Greece offered its creditors a combination of new Greek bonds, now governed 
by English law and containing a full complement of covenant protections, bonds 
issued by the European Financial Stability Facility (backed by Europe’s most 
creditworthy governments), and instruments linked to Greece’s economic output. 
Compensating Greek CDS holders for actual reduction in the value of the old Greek 
bonds would require establishing the value of this exit package as a percentage of 
the face value of the old bonds. But ISDA’s auction mechanism had no way of 
valuing the total package and, notably, no way of reflecting bonds issued by anyone 
other than Greece in the payout calculation. 
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Two potentially perverse scenarios became immediately apparent: first, where 
wiping out the old bonds freed up debtor resources and made the new bonds so 
valuable that an auction would dramatically under-compensate the old bond 
holders; second, where the new bonds formed only a small part of the exchange 
package, but were alone eligible to tender in the auction, resulting in dramatic over-
compensation of the old bond holders.115 Neither of the perverse scenarios came 
about in Greece. An auction on 19 March brought about a payout just under 80%, 
roughly in line with the losses on the old Greek bonds. 
A confluence of odd facts helped bring about this outcome. First, even after deep 
haircuts on the old bonds, Greek debt remained patently unsustainable, and traded at a 
big discount. Second, even though this discount might have been insufficient in itself 
to ensure adequate payout, the fact that the new bonds formed only a portion of the 
exchange proceeds further increased the payout. No doubt the ISDA DC members 
charged with compiling a list of deliverable obligations in the Greek settlement were 
keenly aware of the imperative to approximate the actual losses on the old bonds.116 
However, ISDA specifically rejected appeals to construe deliverable obligations 
                                                                                                                                               
115  The following hypotheticals illustrate the challenge embedded in the assumptions that the 
old impaired obligation still exists and that a Restructuring Credit Event produces a single exit 
instrument: 
– Assume that Greece used CACs to reduce the face value of its bonds by 75 per cent. Let us 
also assume that the new bonds were now certain to repay in full thanks to the combination of 
deep debt reduction, new contractual protections and the choice of English law to govern the 
instruments. The market value of a new €1000 Greek bond would be its face value, or €1000. 
Because it is the only Greek bond available, it would be ‘cheapest to deliver’ into CDS 
settlement. But delivering a new bond would produce net zero payout. The new bonds would 
be valuable precisely because the old bonds had been wiped out; however, if the old bonds 
were all tendered in the exchange and cancelled by the debtor, they would not be around to 
value in the auction or tender in the settlement. 
– Suppose instead that Greece exchanged its old bonds for a package of new English-law Greek 
bonds (trading at 40 cents on the euro of their new face value), EFSF bonds (trading at 99 
cents on the euro) and GDP warrants (current value unknown). For simplicity, assume that 
each bondholder got the same package, valued in the aggregate at 50 cents on the euro of the 
old bonds – leaving a loss of 50 cents to be made up by the CDS payout. But if the only 
instrument eligible for tender in the settlement auction were the new Greek bond trading at 40 
cents on the euro, CDS protection sellers would have to pay 60 cents, and participants in the 
exchange would get a windfall in the form of the EFSF bonds and the GDP warrants. 
See, e.g., F. Salmon, ‘How Greece’s Default Could Kill the Sovereign CDS Market’, Reuters, 29 
February 2012, available at: <http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/02/29/how-greeces-
default-could-kill-the-sovereign-cds-market>; ‘The Auction Problem’ (7 April 2012), available 
at: <http://www.breakingviews.com/the-auction-problem/21009343.article>. 
116  A note to the DC decision on deliverable obligations is revealing: the Committee 
acknowledges having considered and rejected the possibility of counting the entire restructuring 
package towards CDS settlement. The decision might have been different if including more 
instruments were the only way to reflect actual losses. ISDA, DC Decision (19 March 2012), 
available at: <http://www.isda.org/dc/docs/EMEA_Determinations_Committee_Decision_1303 
2012.pdf>. 
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broadly to track the economics of the Greek exchange. DC members’ skill and the 
fact that they had enough bonds to work with to produce the right number in the end, 
as if by magic, should not obscure the fact that they reached this result by going the 
wrong way. 
*** 
In this section, we have offered a description of the events leading up to the trigger 
and settlement of credit default swaps in the Greek debt crisis. Our purpose is not to 
contest ISDA’s interpretations of its contracts, which were defensible, nor to 
propose reform, which others have done.117 We might go further than others to 
exclude the Subordination credit event from sovereign CDS, or, if it were to 
remain, to include an event based on the granting of collateral, to parallel negative 
pledge safeguards. It may be worth considering whether a credible threat of default 
in the context of a sovereign debt exchange might, under some circumstances, 
constitute Repudiation of the holdout debt, and whether some exit amendments that 
do not change payment terms should qualify as Restructuring, if binding on all.118 
But that is not our preoccupation. 
Instead, we find this case study interesting for what it reveals about the 
institutional and political imperatives of financial contract interpretation. For nearly 
a year, perhaps more, ISDA had been caught between a market that looked to it to 
ensure the viability of sovereign CDS, and governments that saw these instruments 
as a threat and seemed determined to undermine them. If the market survived, it 
would emerge heavily regulated – much more heavily if the Greek crisis had 
brought about widespread disruption, and CDS got the blame. Some market 
participants said, and others implied, that the mix of political risk and legal 
uncertainty made sovereign CDS more trouble than they were worth. Despite the 
funding and liquidity advantages of CDS over bonds, these players simply got 
out.119 To stem the exodus, CDS contracts had to trigger, but prove non-threatening 
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to the European governments. This required government cooperation and a strategic 
approach to contract interpretation. At every fork in the road, ISDA made a choice 
that helped achieve this result. The instrument that triggered in the end protected 
CDS buyers in the narrowest set of sovereign distress scenarios, was prone to 
manipulation by the debtor and its official backers, and paid out in little logical 
relation to actual losses. Other choices were available along the way. In conclusion, 
we consider the implications of ISDA’s choices in more depth and against the 
background of what we know about the broader universe of commercial contracts. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
ISDA explains its CDS adjudication model by reference to its expertise and 
sensitivity to market context, particularly the economics of credit transfer. But in 
the biggest test to date for the sovereign CDS contracts, ISDA consistently and 
expressly emphasised fidelity to contract text as distinct from economic substance 
of the transaction. It even issued pre-emptive rulings explaining the difference 
between economic and legal outcomes under its contracts. At first blush, this seems 
puzzling. Why take adjudication private if the goal is to promote reflexive fidelity 
to bright-line rules, apparently made brighter at every drafting opportunity? And 
what is the use of technical expertise and contextual knowledge in such an 
adjudication environment? 
To answer these questions, we experiment with putting aside the contract as an 
object and unit of analysis. Instead of asking how to make the sovereign CDS 
contract better – more just or more efficient – through drafting, interpretation and 
enforcement, we ask what work it does for the various actors in our story. We offer 
preliminary thoughts on why we might expect a preference for textualist 
interpretation in sovereign CDS contracts. We next consider whether sovereign 
CDS contracts are unique, or part of a broader category of contracts that lend 
themselves to similar political analysis. 
5.1 What contracts do for the parties 
For dealers and end-users alike, the ISDA contract suite provides the essential 
infrastructure for the derivatives market. It frames relationships among market 
participants, supplies the common language in which they interact, and separates 
derivatives from other financial contracts, which are subject to bankruptcy and 
heavy regulatory oversight. Narrowing the scope for interpretation and stripping out 
context in most individual instruments, including sovereign CDS, should make 
them more easily tradable (like money, or a negotiable instrument). More, faster 
trading should help repeat players; more liquidity in turn should make for more 
efficient pricing for all market participants; the result is a bigger, faster derivatives 
market. Formal consistency and acontextual interpretation also support the global 
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reach of the derivatives market, where participants trade ‘as if.’ instruments and 
institutions reflected shared understanding.120 In sum, we would expect CDS market 
participants as a group to favour adherence to contract text, although any given 
party to an individual contract might prefer the interpretive strategy that maximises 
its gains and minimises its losses in the case at hand. 
This hypothesis has an important caveat. If market participants see ISDA and its 
DCs as expert, unbiased and committed to producing a stream of consistent rulings 
for a robust CDS market, their preference for strict adherence to the text may weaken. 
Traders who delegate interpretation to ISDA at the time of their contract can trade in 
the knowledge that their contracts will be interpreted in a predictable fashion to 
reflect the economics of the instrument; this should support market liquidity. The 
choice between text and context is secondary to the choice of ISDA DCs as the forum 
for important interpretation decisions.121 Contextualism might even be preferable to 
reduce the risk of trigger manipulation by the sovereign debtor. 
Governments are ambivalent about sovereign CDS. Those whose debt is 
referenced in the CDS contracts may view them as a source of market liquidity or 
destructive speculation. CDS offer potential debt buyers a hedging vehicle, which 
should attract more buyers. On the other hand, they also give market participants 
more ways to express pessimism about a credit, which can exacerbate a downward 
price spiral where CDS volumes are substantial. In a debt restructuring, CDS 
contracts can be a help or a hindrance. This is because the existence and size of the 
sovereign CDS market can alter the composition of the sovereign’s creditor body 
and the creditors’ restructuring incentives. Creditors who bought CDS protection 
might favour a clear-cut credit event that would bring them full payout, instead of 
the customary informal workout to avoid default. On the other hand, they might be 
willing to agree to deeper restructuring: their protection sellers would absorb the 
losses, but do not have a seat at the table until after the CDS trigger. 
For the governments whose financial institutions participate in the CDS market 
(often also the governments facing debt distress), ISDA contracts and market 
infrastructure networks can be the source of – or a safeguard against – the spillover 
effects of a sovereign debt crisis. Triggering CDS can bankrupt the firms that sold 
protection, and cause knock-on effects from their failure; on the other hand, it can 
also shift losses to institutions best able to bear them. 
Having ISDA as an informal intermediary can be valuable to governments in all 
the situations just described.122 ISDA can help limit overall economic damage from 
crisis and contagion by fixing an interpretation of its contracts across the market. 
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Any given market-wide interpretation might impose costs on some parties and 
might fail to reflect some private understandings; however, it would reduce 
uncertainty and could be crafted to minimise aggregate losses. A favourable 
market-wide interpretation of certain derivatives contracts could, for example, 
prevent the failure of multiple banks and save governments from bailing them out. 
Similarly, it could relieve pressure on exchange rates and interest rates, and thereby 
support economic recovery. 
By definition, sovereign CDS only raise questions of interpretation in crisis. 
Governments in crisis care about the economic impact of ISDA contract 
interpretation, but not how ISDA gets there. The choice between textualist and 
contextualist strategies as such is of no concern to governments at the time they are 
most focused on interpretation: they just want their currencies to stabilise and their 
banks to survive. In economically and politically significant cases such as Greece, 
where influential governments care about the outcome, we might expect ISDA to 
come under enormous pressure to get the ‘right result’ by any means necessary. 
Under the circumstances, is there any reason to believe that ISDA would gravitate 
to textualist interpretations? 
For ISDA, the contract is its power base. Interpretive error, counterparty failure 
and trading disruptions on a large scale threaten the continued existence of the 
market and ISDA’s central role in it. They could also bring on government 
regulation, which ISDA has successfully avoided for decades. Taking interpretation 
to the DCs consolidated ISDA’s control over the transaction cycle and the market 
in which it takes place. But as we noted earlier, once adjudication is private, 
textualism is not the obvious path. For example, contract counterparties might 
prefer a contextual inquiry into the economics of Greece’s deal with the European 
Central Bank, so long as they are convinced the adjudicator is consistent and 
unbiased. 
But it is far from clear that ISDA and the DCs at the time of the Greek crisis 
enjoyed the level of trust that would allow them to engage in contextual inquiry. 
The DC process was established barely a year before the crisis struck. Before the 
DCs, market participants might have feared uninformed contextualism on the part 
of the public judiciary. After inexpert courts had given way to expert derivatives 
traders, market participants had more reason to fear conflicts of interests and self-
dealing on the part of DC members. In fact, rumours of such conflicts ran rampant 
throughout the Greek saga. The combination of near-mandatory recourse to the 
DCs, and discretion and contextual inquiry on the part of DC adjudicators, was 
politically fraught. If DC members found themselves facing bias, self-dealing and 
abuse of power charges at every turn, industry members might refuse to serve, 
imploding the mechanism and sending ISDA’s contracts back to the public 
judiciary. At this stage, the DC process would benefit from a simple, transparent 
reading of the contracts readily accessible to market participants. So long as the 
economics were defensible, relying on a combination of plain text and publicly 
available, verifiable facts – such as formal pronouncements by the Greek govern-
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ment closely tracking the contract text – would help reassure the market and bolster 
the credibility of the DCs. 
Above all, the Greek crisis was a test of ISDA’s contracts. Producing reasonably 
complete contracts that work, including in times of stress, is ISDA’s core 
competence and the original rationale for its existence. The DCs can do some of the 
completion work, but the onus is on drafting. The last big sovereign debt crisis 
(Argentina) prompted ISDA to rewrite the Credit Derivatives Definitions after the 
public judiciary found them ambiguous. Because it was a much bigger economy 
and implicated a reserve currency, Greece was a bigger test. Here too, the idea that 
the contracts worked, and that ISDA was not just bending to political pressure, 
required constituent buy-in. If making the text work required importing a whole lot 
of context, including hard-to-verify facts of the Finnish collateral deal, veiled 
threats by the sovereign and regulatory moral suasion, the contract would look 
incomplete and ambiguous again. Against this background, it is perhaps no surprise 
that ISDA representatives were at pains to describe the ‘legal meaning’ of the 
contracts as certain and plain to all – as distinct from the messy debates about 
transaction economics and Greek debt sustainability.123 DC decisions had to be 
about contract words and government formalities, both visible to their lay audience, 
even if lawyers have long known these to be manipulable.124 
In sum, there are several reasons why we might expect ISDA to prefer textualist 
interpretation strategies in the Greek crisis. First, minimising recourse to context 
can support CDS market liquidity. Second, while having an expert, impartial 
adjudicator can mitigate the risks from contextual interpretation without hurting 
market liquidity, neither ISDA’s DC process nor its sovereign CDS contracts 
seemed to have the requisite legitimacy to support heavily recourse to context. 
Textualist interpretation helped ISDA and its DCs ‘render account’125 of their 
process to boost confidence in both drafting and interpretation. Third, European 
governments in 2010-2012 preferred an interpretation of CDS credit events that 
minimised the incidence and amount of payouts, and therefore the systemic effect 
of the crisis. This too argued for textualist reading in this case. However, it does not 
follow that this interpretive strategy must prevail in all cases. At another time, 
political pressure to deliver a particular outcome to satisfy governments or powerful 
constituents could trump other factors and support a contextualist turn. The task for 
future research is to identify the political and institutional factors that militate in 
favour of any given strategy, taking the analysis beyond party incentives and the 
transactional context. 
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5.2 The politics of interpreting financial contracts 
It remains for us to consider whether our story is a fluke, reflecting a confluence of 
political, legal and economic factors unlikely to repeat, which therefore holds no 
interest for the broader study of contracts. We do not think so. 
We have described a category of contracts whose interpretation has economic 
and political significance apart from their meaning for any given party. Writing 
about contracts traditionally locates politics in the contest between weak and strong 
parties, with the judiciary choosing sides. We follow the scholarship on business 
contracts to describe relationships where at least in theory both sides are 
sophisticated, and neither is in need of state protection. The political import of CDS 
and other derivatives contracts is in their systemic character: they are ubiquitous, 
highly standardised, and interconnected with many parts of the national and global 
economies. Others in this category might include common forms of wholesale 
financing (for example, ‘repo’ agreements), contracts that incorporate widely used 
indices (such as gold or LIBOR),126 and mortgage securitisation contracts. Their 
interpretation can cause economic dislocation, affecting financial stability and 
public finances. 
Where contracts play such a public role, the concern is not their effect on the 
parties, but on the economy as a whole. Economic policy and politics will figure 
prominently in contract interpretation. Analysing these contracts in the traditional 
terms of transactional efficiency or fairness would miss the big picture and the 
elephant in the room. Our reading of ISDA contracts in the Greek crisis suggests 
the need to study contract drafting, interpretation and adjudication as broader 
institutional and political phenomena. We would not expect textualism to be the 
preferred strategy in each case. However, we would ask about the role of contracts 
in mediating industry power dynamics, interest group politics and market 
participants’ interactions with the state, to help explain the approach to interpre-
tation. 
Defending its market against government regulation has long been a core part of 
ISDA’s mission. This task became urgent in the wake of the financial crises 
beginning in 2007, as more intrusive regulation became inevitable. To preserve its 
market, and retain control over it, ISDA had to perform a delicate dance: it had to 
assure governments that CDS would not threaten financial stability, even as it had 
to assure market participants that their instruments would pay out according to their 
terms, come what may. Against this background, textualism had several political 
uses. It signalled to the regulators that ISDA and its DCs could exercise tight 
control over a rapidly growing and politically sensitive market. It told the market 
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participants that their contracts worked, but also that they were technically complex 
and required special expertise and institutional infrastructure, which only ISDA 
could marshal. It demonstrated that ISDA DCs could produce impartial, consistent, 
and verifiable rulings for their market constituents. It also showed them that ISDA 
could keep governments at bay, despite officials’ threats to the contrary. On the 
cost side of the ledger, the sovereign CDS instrument emerging from the Greek 
crisis does little by way of risk transfer. But if sticking to the text created a space 
for ISDA and its market to regroup, sovereign CDS zombies may be poised for a 
comeback. 
